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SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
The Freedom of Private Employers to Discriminate
by Holly Hecker
Homosexuals in the United States experience discri-
mination in many areas of their lives, including employment
Unlike other citizens who are members of distinct portions
of society, such as people of color, religious groups, women,
racial groups and ethnic groups, homosexuals have not
been given protected group status under the law. They have,
in fact, often suffered under an uneven application of the
law as expressed by judges who have, for example, treated
the due process rights of homosexuals in a superficial man-
ner. Since homosexuals number about twenty million men
and women in the United States,2 and since homosexuals
are found in all economic classes, all types of jobs, all
religions, all racial groups and all ethnic groups, their in-
tersection with heterosexual society is extensive. Their
economic, psychological and social stakes in the larger
society are also extensive,3 and employment discrimination
does a great deal of harm, both to the homosexual discri-
minated against and to society which loses the services of
valuable employees for reasons having nothing to do with
an individual's ability to perform a job.4
Because this paper will look at discrimination against
homosexual men and lesbians, the definition of a homosex-
ual is important. Funk and Wagnalrs defines homosexual
as "attracted by or in love with persons of the same sex.
This however, raises some problems. Does this mean that
someone who had a high school crush on a teacher of the
same sex is homosexual? Is someone homosexual who has
had a same-sex sexual encounter? How many encounters
makes one homosexual? One? Two? Ten? Do teen age
same-sex sexual encounters count, or must one be an adult
to earn the label? What sort of behaviors are we talking
about? Close, deep emotional attachment to another of the
same sex? Hugging and kissing? Fantasies? Overt sexual
conduct, such as mutual touching to orgasm, fellatio,
cunnilingus, sodomy? What is a person who says he or she
is homosexual, but who remains celibate?
According to Kinsey, human sexual behavior can be
described by considering a continuum, with exclusively
heterosexual people on one end and exclusively homosex-
ual people on the other end. These people fantasize and
act sexually only with persons of, for the heterosexual, the
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opposite sex, and for the homosexual, only with persons
of the same sex. People between the endpoints of this con-
tinuum have more mixed erotic arousal and overt ex-
perience.5 This scheme can be illustrative of a person's en-
tire life span or of a particular period in a person's life.6
Despite these difficulties in labeling anyone homosex-
ual, the courts, like private individuals, have little trouble
assigning the label to many different types of individuals.
For example:7
- a married father who engaged in same-sex
sexual behavior in his late teens,'
- a man with a single conviction for a same-
sex crime,9
- a woman whose friends were bisexual, 0
- a man who said he was a homosexual, but
who never admitted to any overt same-sex
behavior,"
- women in mannish attire,' 2
- persons who exhibited characteristics and
mannerisms which evidenced homosexual pro-
pensities,13
- men who seemed effeminate. 4
One consequence of this casual approach to labeling
someone as a homosexual person is that those men and
women who least fit their appropriate sex stereotype are
those most likely to be labeled a gay man or lesbian,
regardless of their actual sexual preference. Thus, a man
who is soft-spoken, uninterested in sports or wearing an
earring may be considered a homosexual, while a woman
who is assertive, career-oriented, self-sufficient and single
may well be called a lesbian. These stereotypical versions
of homosexuality - a feminine man and a masculine
woman - mean that those people who fit these images
are the first to suffer discrimination.
Since homosexuality is such a difficult concept to
define, this paper is limited to two definitions. The first is
homosexuality as used in court cases; regardless of whether
this view accurately defines an individual, it does
demonstrate the prevailing legal thought The second defini-
tion is that which is used by an individual to define himself
or herself, this may be taken as an accurate description of
that individual's view of him/herself in the world.
Despite the fact that homosexual men and lesbians
differ from the rest of the population only with respect to
their sexual preferences, homosexuals enjoy little protec-
tion from discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion and the
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distribution of fringe benefits, especially in private sector
employment. This paper will examine sexual preference
discrimination in private employment. It will explore some
of the attempts to challenge the private employer's freedom
to discriminate "at will" on the basis of sexual preference
It will also look at some possible alternatives to address
and redress this form of discrimination.
Despite the limited gains homosexuals have achieved
with regard to lessening discrimination in public employ-
ment, 5 employers in the private sector are still free to act
on their basest prejudices in any way not explicitly pro-
hibited by statute. 6 There are no federal statutes and only
one state statute 7 which prohibit a private employer from
discriminating against a lesbian or gay man. Recently some
county and municipal ordinances have been enacted which
forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but
there is little documentation of their effectiveness as yet.'8
Seventy percent of American workers are "at will"
employees, 9 and, as such, the employer may dismiss them
'for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong °20 Thus,
any employer may refuse to hire, refuse to promote or
dismiss any person he suspects of being homosexual.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the only
federal legislation that prohibits discrimination by private
employers based on certain enumerated categories.2 ' Sex-
ual preference, sexual orientation and homosexuality are
not among the enumerations. However, sex is one of these
proscribed categories.
There have been several attempts to broaden "sex as
used in Title VII to include discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. In the first case to raise this type of argu-
ment, Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,22 the court
held that Title VII did not forbid employment discrimina-
tion based on "affectional or sexual preference" of the job
applicant, despite the fact that the plaintiff was character-
ized only as "effeminate' never as homosexual.2 3 The court,
in examining the intent of Title VII, found that it guarantees
equal job opportunity for males and females, but the ques-
tion of forbidding discrimination based on affectional or
sexual preference' must be left to Congress, and Congress
has not proscribed this form of discrimination.2 4 The court
further stated that "rights not forbidden are reserved to the
individual .... If the lawmaking process has yet reserved
freedom of action (by not forbidding it) to an employer, it
is the duty of the courts to protect it.25 Thus, the court
invoked the broadest principles to protect an employer's
right to hire and fire "at will"
Voyles v. Ralph K Davis Medical Center 6 was decid-
ed four months later in another district court. Although this
case dealt with the question of whether Title VII protected
the rights of transsexuals, the court, in holding that it did
not, expanded that lack of protection to homosexuals and
bisexuals as well 27 The plaintiff here, a hemodialysis techni-
cian, was discharged shortly before undergoing a sexual-
reassignment operation. The defendant admitted that the
reason for the firing was that both the plaintiffs co-workers
and patients receiving dialysis at the center might be
adversely affected by the sex-change.2
The Voyles court seems to have been unaware of the
differences between a homosexual person and a transsex-
ual person.29 Referring to pending legislation to amend
Title VII to include homosexuals as a protected class, the
court said that the fact that these amendments had not
passed30 made it "clear that in enacting Title VII, Congress
had no intention of proscribing discrimination based on an
individual's transsexualism, 3'
Several years later another court used similar reason-
ing to deny Title VII coverage in a case involving a transsex-
ual. The Ninth Circuit in Holloway v. Arthur Anderson &
Co.32 concluded that Congress had only the "traditional no-
tions of sex in mind,"33 and since bills to amend Title VII
to include homosexuality were never enacted, the court
refused this chance to extend Title VII coverage 3 4
Hodges v. John Morrell Co.3 5 is one case involving
Title VII and homosexuality that did withstand a motion
to dismiss. The plaintiff alleged that the terms and condi-
tions of his employment were dependent upon his grant-
ing sexual favors to the defendant's personnel manager.
Although defendant argued that Title VII had never been
found to cover homosexual persons and that the complaint
should be dismissed, the court said this was not a case
of discrimination against a group of unusual sexual orienta-
tion.3 6 "It is simply a case involving the alleged imposition
of conditions of employment on a male employee, which
would not have been imposed on a female employee similar-
ly situated"37 In other words, this case was actually a case
of sexual harassment of a male.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), an agency created by Congress to carry out the
goals of Title VII, has been as adamant as the courts in
refusing to extend Title VII protection to homosexuals. In
1966 the General Counsel issued an Opinion Letter holding
that an employer did not commit an unfair employment
practice by failing to hire or by discharging a homosexual
individual.38 In 1975, the EEOC rendered two decisions,
both finding that sexual orientation was not intended by
Congress to be included within the meaning of the word
"sex," and further finding, therefore, that EEOC lacked
jurisdiction to deal with complaints by homosexual
employees.3 9
Another Title VII challenge to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation was attempted in 1979. On ap-
peal, DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.40 was
a consolidation of three separate cases, 4' each of which
had been dismissed by district courts for failing to state
a claim under Title VII.42 The plaintiffs argued that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation had a
disparate impact on males and therefore was a Title VII
violation within the "sex" category.43 They based their argu-
ment on the interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company,4 4 in which the US. Supreme Court held
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that the Act proscribes "practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation; 45 as well as overt discrimina-
tion. In Griggs, the Court held that such practices, unless
they could be shown to be related to job performance,
would be prohibited, regardless of the employer's intent.46
There are two premises on which this disparate im-
pact argument rests when analyzing cases involving
homosexuality. The first is that there are reported to be
more male homosexuals than lesbians.4' The second is that
the sexual preference of gay men is more likely to be
discovered than that of lesbians because of their more ex-
tensive intersection with record-keeping authorities, such
as the military and the police 48 The DeSantis court did not
accept this argument, simply stating that disparate impact
should be limited to situations that correspond to Congress'
intent when it adopted Title VII.49 Judicially granting Title
VII protection to homosexuals was considered improper,
since it was seen as frustrating the Congressional intent
to deny Title VII coverage to lesbians and homosexual
men.50 In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice
Sneed indicated that if the plaintiffs had been able to
demonstrate a disparate impact on males, they would have
shown a Title VII violation.51
Demonstrating disparate impact on males is a difficult
task, however. Discrimination against gay employees or ap-
plicants must be shown to disproportionately impact on
males as a class. More must be shown than that propor-
tionately more gay men than lesbians suffer. The showing
probably will require use of a population in which gay males
are a large proportion of the total applicable male popula-
tion.52
Disparate impact was one of the theories alleged in
Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. (GLSA v. PT&T).5 In a class action, gay
organizations and individuals claimed that PT&T had a pat-
tem. and practice of employment discrimination against
homosexual persons. They also filed a charge against the
California Fair Employment Practice Commission (FEPC)
on the grounds that it had improperly refused to take any
action to remedy alleged employment discrimination. The
trial court entered judgment for both defendants.5 4 The
court questioned the applicability of Griggs to males as a
class, but went on to hold that even if Griggs did apply,
no showing of disparate impact had been made. No proof
had been offered showing that PT&T had excluded a signifi-
cant number of males; no statistics were offered to establish
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the disparate impact on males of discrimination against gay
people.5
As several commentators point out,5 6 there is another
problem with the disparate impact approach. Both
homosexual men and lesbians experience discrimination
based on their sexual orientation. Advancing a disparate
impact argument smacks of "the expediency of sexism and
of 'Me First."57 To show equal treatment, employers may
resort to firing all women even suspected of being lesbian.
To argue the rights of gay men in such a way that in effect
pits gay men against lesbians does little to acknowledge
the fact that this form of discrimination, based as it is on
heterosexual antipathy towards and fear of homosexual-
ity, is felt by gay men and lesbians alike. It does not pro-
vide a basis for all victims of this discrimination to work
together to overcome it and is not a very positive way to
establish private employment rights for homosexual
individuals.
Another way for plaintiffs to challenge discrimination
through Title VII has been mentioned by at least two
commentators58 and is based on Justice Marshall's con-
curring opinion in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.9 The
theory is that Congressional intent in enacting Title VII was
to prohibit employment discrimination based on irrelevant
stereotypes. Discrimination against homosexuals frustrates
this intent. Courts should therefore construe the term "sex;
as used in Title VII, to include sexual preference as an im-
permissible classification.60
Phillips recognized this Congressional attempt to pro-
hibit discrimination based on stereotypes.6 1 This case
challenged a corporate policy of not accepting employment
applications from women with preschool age children. 62 The
per curiam opinion held that all parents with preschool age
children must be subject to the same hiring policy, unless
the corporation could show that having children is
"demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a
woman: 6' The court noted that if this relevancy to job per-
formance were shown, it arguably could be a basis for
discriminatory hiring practices. Here, however, insufficient
evidence had been tendered to support a decision that the
presence of preschool age children was more relevant to
job performance for women.64
Justice Marshall disagreed in his concurring opinion:
... Congress intended to prevent employers
from refusing to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes ...
Even characterizations of the proper domestic
roles of the sexes were not to serve as
predicates for restricting employment oppor-
tunity.65
Marshall argued that homosexuals do not fit one of the
most basic "stereotyped characterizations of the sexes"
66
which is that a person's sexual preference be for a member
of the opposite sex. Some homosexuals, those most likely
to feel the severest effects of discrimination, exhibit
characteristics inappropriate to his or her gender; an ef-
feminate man or a masculine woman will experience
discrimination because of their deviation from these gender
stereotypes. In addition, any gay man or lesbian whose
sexual preference becomes known, or even suspected or
presumed, in the workplace may be discriminated against
because of these "stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes
67
This equation of deviation from stereotyped charac-
terization to a presumption of homosexuality, leading to
discrimination and a resultant lack of protection, is clearly
demonstrated in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.68
and in Strailey v. Happy Tilmes Nursery School.69 In neither
case was there evidence that the plaintiff was homosex-
ual. Instead, both were found to have acted in a manner
inappropriate for a stereotypical male; the plaintiff in Smith
was considered effeminate by the defendant 0 and the plain-
tiff in Strailey wore an earring to work one day.7 I The
District Court in Smith denied a Title VII claim because
the term "sex" did not include sexual preference. 2 In Strailey,
the Ninth Circuit held that discrimination based on ef-
feminacy is not banned by Title VII, since Title VII doesn't
ban discrimination based on sexual preference." The courts
equated effeminate characteristics with homosexuality in
both these cases.
Discrimination based on just that sort of stereotyped
view of proper gender roles was what Congress intended
to prohibit by passing Title VII.74 As one commentator has
said:
Justice Marshall ... recognized that "characteri-
zation of the proper domestic roles of the sexes?
were not legitimate bases for discrimination.
Likewise, characterizations of the proper sex
roles of the sexes are not legitimate bases for
discrimination. Neither domestic nor sexual role
is relevant to employment opportunity. Thus to
implement Congressional intent, Courts should
construe the term "sex'7 as used in Title VII, to
include sexual preference as an impermissible
classification.75
Another possible federal route for challenging
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), which prohibits any conspiracy to deprive a per-
son or class of persons of the equal protection of the law,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the law, which
results in injury or deprivation. 76 Section 1985(3) sets up
a high hurdle for a plaintiff, however, and no homosexual
individual or group claiming employment discrimination has
so far successfully cleared it. A plaintiff must satisfy the
conspiracy requirement, must establish homosexuals as a
protected class and must prove that a protected right has
been harmed by the defendant. 77
Conspiracy is usually claimed by alleging that policies
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and practices of management are carried out by employees
and/or agents of a company. This has been hard to establish
and the federal circuit courts disagree on how to consider
conspiracy in the corporate world."8
The requirements for showing a protected class were
established by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin
v. Breckenridge.9 "Some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the con-
spirators' action 80 must be established. This class-based
animus has been found in discrimination against many
groups besides the southern blacks the statute was original-
ly enacted to protect. Among these groups have been:81
- women purchasers of disability insurance,82
- political opponents,
3
- supporters of a political candidate,
8 4
- persons holding a particular political view,
85
- members of the Jewish faith, 6
- members of a single family.87
The plaintiffs in DeSantis v. PT&T,8 8 in claiming an ac-
tion under § 1985(3), argued that gay people are a group
discriminated against by a class-based animus, but the
Ninth Circuit found no other evidence of federal protection
for homosexuals and refused to recognize the protection
of § 1985(3).89 This requirement that other federal legisla-
tion already protect gays before § 1985(3) will protect them
is a limitation not found in other § 1985(3) cases.
The DeSantis court gave two examples of federal pro-
tection that might lead to § 1985(3) protection: inclusion
within the Title VII enumerated classes, and "suspect" or
"quasi-suspect" classification by the courts for purposes of
equal protection analysis.90 The first example leads to a
dead end for gay employees at present; no court has found
them encompassed by the term "sex," and the Supreme
Court, in a 1979 decision,91 held that deprivation of a
Title VII right cannot be remedied through a § 1985(3)
claim. 2 Therefore, as one commentator noted, "if Title VII
protection is required to establish existence of a §1985(3)
protected class, § 1985(3) will be rendered virtually useless
for employment discrimination purposes 93
The concept of suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classifica-
tion of homosexuals for purposes of equal protection
analysis has evoked much legal commentary lately.
9 4
Presently the only suspect classes are grouped by race,
alienage and national origin.9 5 The criteria for a suspect
class include political powerlessness, subjection to pur-
poseful unequal treatment based on traits over which the
individual has no control, immutability of characteristics,
a status which frequently bears no relationship to an in-
dividual's ability to perform or contribute to society, and
a classification more the reflection of historic prejudices
than legislative rationality.96 Homosexuals share most, if
not all, of these criteria. Their political powerlessness is
demonstrated by the fact that, despite numbering twenty
million, gay men and lesbians lack the basic employment
protections enjoyed by all other citizens. Discrimination
against them is intentional and based on their homosex-
uality or the presumption of it, an orientation that many
psychiatrists and psychologists are now saying is not
capable of change.9 7 Most homosexuals are responsible,
job-holding members of society with problems which, if they
stem from homosexuality at all, are caused by the op-
probrium in which society holds them, rather than being
an outgrowth of their sexual preference, thus illustrating the
irrationality of this prejudice Since homosexuality fulfills
the criteria for suspect classification, there seems little
reason to deny § 1985(3) protection.
Furthermore, there is already some minimal federal pro-
tection for homosexual men and lesbians which might
satisfy the DeSantis court's requirement for §1985(3) pro-
tection.98 The Guidelines of the Civil Service Regulations
establish special protection from arbitrary discrimination
against gay people in federal employment.9 9 In addition, 42
U.S.C. §1983 provides protection against deprivation of a
gay persons civil rights under color of state law.I00 Both
§§ 1983 and 1985 were enacted at the same time and were
joined in one act! 0 ' Although the DeSantis court does not
address the § 1983 protections, 0 2 some courts have noted
that "acceptance of § 1983 claims lends weight to an argu-
ment that § 1985(3) protection should be recognized"' 0 3
Strict scrutiny of classifications based on homosex-
uality could also be required by a demonstration that a fun-
damental right, such as the right to privacy or freedom of
association, is directly affected by the unequal treatment.
Courts are reluctant to find such fundamental rights in cases
affecting homosexuals, however. Despite a powerful dissent-
ing opinion in a recent case denying a petition of certiorari,
the firing of a bisexual high school guidance counselor was
found to violate no constitutional principles or any federal
law, despite trial court and jury findings for the plaintiff! 0 4
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) may pro-
tect gay union members' under interpretations that re-
quire unions to fairly represent all members, the prohibi-
tion against employer interference with union activities and
the usual just-cause dismissal clause in union contracts.
Unions have an affirmative duty to represent each employee
on an equal basis. 0 6 According to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB), °7 this duty also prohibits a union from
"taking action against any employee upon considerations
or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious or unfair. " 08
If an employee has a cause of action against the union, the
employee also has an action against the employer who par-
ticipates in the discrimination! 0 9 This means that if a union
takes action against a gay employee because of his/her sex-
ual orientation, the action would be based on an irrelevant,
invidious or unfair classification. If an employer acquiesced
or participated in the union's action, a gay employee would
have a cause of action against the employer, as well.
The struggle for gay rights is gaining increased recogni-
tion as a political movement for civil rights. It is likely that
eventually a union, particularly one with a large number of
gay members, will act to obtain fair treatment of its gay
members. The NLRA holds an employer liable for any in-
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terference with those union activities which are legitimate
forums for employee action! ' Arguably, protection of the
employment rights of the homosexual employee - allevia-
tion of the fear of being arbitrarily dismissed because of
sexual orientation - is a valid aim of employee action, and
any interference with actions toward this goal would lead
to a cause of action against the employer.
The common provision in labor contracts, that
dismissal must be based on just cause may provide the
best protection to homosexual employees. The usual resolu-
tion of just cause disputes is through arbitration, and
arbitrators are reluctant to encourage employer censorship
of an employees off-duty conduct. A requirement that a
direct relationship between the off-duty conduct and
employment be shown is commonly found in arbitration
decisions!" This relationship may be difficult for an
employer to show, especially if the conduct has not been
accorded widespread publicity and the employee does not
have contact with the general public.
In general, federal protection of homosexual men and
women in private employment is weak. In spite of the fact
that homosexuals share many characteristics with the
enumerated groups of Title VII and the categories which
have been deemed deserving of § 1985(3) protection,
homosexuals still face the brunt of historic, irrational prej-
udices. Federal judges, often imbued with these same prej-
udices, have been extremely slow in recognizing the value
of according employment protection to this insular and op-
pressed minority.
State law may provide some remedy to employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. GLSA
v. PT&," 2 discussed earlier as a Title VII action, led to
some unique and intriguing results under state law. Because
the court found state action in the extensive government
regulations of a public utility, PT&T was seen as "more akin
to a governmental entity than to a purely private
employer?1"3 PT&T was accordingly restrained by the state's
equal protection clause from arbitrarily discriminating
against any class of persons!?14 The court then held that
California's Public Utilities Code precluded PT&T and other
utilities from arbitrary discrimination in employment?'
5
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the court found that
"the struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights,
particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized
as a political activity.1 6 Interference with an employee's right
to engage in political action is a violation of the states Labor
Code" 7 Because the court construed plaintiffs' allegations
as charging that "PT&T discriminates in particular against
persons who identify themselves as homosexuals, who de-
fend homosexuality, or who are identified with activist
homosexual organizations,"" the court therefore found a
violation of California's Labor Code." 9 According to one
commentator, this reasoning, if other states adopt it, "would
have far-reaching beneficial effects on the rights of gay
employees. However, it is wise at this time to regard the
decision as idiosyncratic to California' 120 Little protection
still exists under state law for most gay employees in private
employment.
Local ordinances that prohibit sexual orientation dis-
crimination have been enacted in some counties and cities,
including Buffalo. 21 These vary widely in scope and many
have been in place such a short time that it is difficult to
gauge their effectiveness. 22 There are difficulties with these
ordinances, ranging from a lack of money and the will to
enforce them to questions concerning their constitu-
tionality. 23
Another possible approach is through common law
tort doctrine. A plaintiff has several possible allegations:
- Violation of constitutional, statutory and
common law rights,
- assault, battery and harassment,
- infliction of emotional distress,
- wrongful discharge
- interference with contractual relations and
prospective economic advantage1 24
Contract law may provide another avenue to challenge
discrimination. Standard contract and commercial clauses
such as breach of contract and UCC violations may be ap-
plicable Breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing might also be argued.
25
However, many of these approaches promise little to
an individual who has been discriminated against because
of sexual orientation. Even the remedies available to the
enumerated categories are difficult to obtain and provide
relatively little redress to members of those protected
groups. Proof problems can be overwhelming, especially
for plaintiffs with little money. Back pay awards must be
mitigated, and years may be spent in litigation. Gay plain-
tiffs face even greater challenges in the courtroom 126 They
do not belong to a protected class; since judges share the
fears and prejudices of the general population, they are
reluctant to expand protection to someone of "unusual sex-
ual orientation.' 2 7 While labor law offers some hope few
employees work under a collective bargaining agreement.
Both tort and contract doctrines may provide avenues of
redress, but they require an expansion of present law to
a class that is not viewed favorably by most courts.
There may still be an opening in Title VII if the argu-
ment on stereotyping can be made in the right context
before a receptive court. Sections 1983 and 1985 provide
difficult proof problems for a plaintiff, but may provide some
protection for a gay employee under certain circumstances.
Of somewhat more assistance may be labor codes and local
antidiscrimination ordinances.
Discrimination against an individual because of actual
or assumed homosexuality is harmful to society as well as
to the individual victims of such discrimination. Ones sex-
ual preference for persons of the same sex has as little bear-
ing on an individual's capacity to be a responsible and com-
petent employee as does an individual's preference for
someone of the opposite sex. People are far more than their
erotic desires, and society stands to lose the services of
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one tenth of the population 12 8 as a result of prejudice and
fear. Congressional approval of the addition of 'sexual orien-
tation" to the enumerated categories of Title VII, for exam-
ple, would indicate to the American people, and the
American employer in particular, that lesbians and gay men
have a right to be free from arbitrary discrimination.
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